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What  sort  of  epistemic  positions  are  compatible  with  inquiries  driven  by  interrogative                         
attitudes  like  wonder  and  puzzlement?  The  ignorance  norm  provides  a  partial  answer:                         
interrogative  attitudes  directed  at  a  particular  question  are  never  compatible  with                       
knowledge  of  the  question’s  answer.  But  some  are  tempted  to  think  that  interrogative                           
attitudes  are  incompatible  with  weaker  positions  like  belief  as  well.  This  paper                         
defends  that  the  ignorance  norm  is  exhaustive.  All  epistemic  positions  weaker  than                         
knowledge  directed  at  the  answer  to  a  question  are  compatible  with  having  an                           
interrogative  attitude  towards  that  question.  We  offer  two  arguments  for  this                       
conclusion.  The  first  is  based  on  considerations  about  the  role  of  hedging  in  inquiry.                             
The  second  is  conditional  on  considerations  related  to  the  aim  of  inquiry  as  a                             
goal-directed  activity.   
  
1.  Introduction   
Inquiry  driven  by  a  question  is  governed  by  a  variety  of  norms.  It  is  impermissible,                               
for  example,  to  open  a  neighbor’s  packages  just  because  one  is  curious  about  what  is                               
inside.  There  are  other  ways  to  quell  boredom.  When  wondering  about  where  to  get                             
coffee  in  Seattle,  one  should  not  proceed  by  reading  every  review  of  every  coffee  shop                               
in  the  city.  There  are  more  effective  strategies.  This  paper  is  about  a  subset  of  the                                 
norms  that  regulate  inquiry  as  an  activity.     
We  assume  that  some  —  if  not  all  —  inquiries  are  goal-directed  activities  in                             
which  participating  agents  aim  to  answer  a  question  they  are  interested  in.  Such                           
inquiries  are  driven  by  interrogative  attitudes  (IAs)  like  curiosity  or  wonder                       
(Friedman  2013).  A  necessary  condition  of  inquiry  is  therefore  psychological.  To                       1
inquire  into  a  question  is  in  part  to  direct  the  appropriate  attitude  to  that  question.                               
IAs  are  what  distinguish  genuine  inquirers  from  those  who  merely  appear  to  be                           
inquirers  given  their  outward  behavior.   
The  norms  we  focus  on  are  those  which  prohibit  occupying  a  particular                         
epistemic  position  while  possessing  an  IA.  Since  inquiry  requires  an  IA,  the  norms                           
prohibit  conducting  inquiry  when  in  a  particular  position.  Certain  positions  are                       
1  A  potential  example  of  a  different  kind  of  inquiry  is  discussed  by  Kelp  (forthcoming).  Kelp                                 
suggests  that  in  addition  to  inquiry  whose  target  is  settling  a  question,  there  is  also  inquiry  whose                                   
target  is  understanding  a  phenomenon.  Such  inquiry  differs  potentially  along  two  dimensions:  it  is                             
phenomenon-directed  as  opposed  to  question-directed  and  not  driven  by  an  interrogative  attitude  but                           
a  desire  or  intention  to  understand.  In  this  paper,  our  focus  is  on  the  former  kind  of  inquiry.  Though                                       
one  of  us  is  inclined  to  think  that  inquiry  directed  at  understanding  a  phenomenon  just  is  inquiry                                   
directed  at  settling  a  question,  we  sidestep  getting  entangled  into  issues  in  the  epistemology  of                               
understanding.     
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clearly  not  compatible  with  inquiry.  For  example,  consider  Nikolai’s  behavior  in  this                         
case.        
Leftover  Milk   
Nikolai  knows  he  has  le over  milk.  But  he  wonders  whether  he  has  le over  milk.  So  he                                 
opens  up  his  fridge  to  check.  Just  as  he  knew  there  would  be,  an  entire  half  gallon  sits  on                                       
the  shelf.   
Nikolai  is  acting  improperly.  As  his  inquiry  is  guided  by  an  IA  towards  a  question  —                                 
he  wonders  whether  there  is  any  le over  milk  — he  would  utter  (1)  were  he  to                               
narrate  his  state.     
(1) #  I  know  there  is  le over  milk.  But  is  there,  I  wonder?     
But  (1)  is  alarmingly  defective.  Nikolai’s  behavior  in  Leftover  Milk  shows  that  he                           
is  not  in  good  epistemic  health.      
To  explain  Nikolai’s  troubling  behavior,  we  cast  our  lot  in  with  Whitcomb  (2017,                           
152)  and  Friedman  (2017,  311)  who  each  propose  there  is  a  norm  prohibiting  an  agent                               
from  knowing  the  answer  to  a  question  into  which  they  are  inquiring.  Where  p Q                             
indicates  that  p  is  a  complete  as  opposed  to  partial  answer  to  a  question  Q,  we                                 
present  the  norm  thusly.     2
Ignorance  Norm  (IGN)     
One  ought  not  inquire  into  Q  at  t  and  know  p Q   at  t .     
The  norm  explains  what  is  amiss  about  Nikolai’s  behavior.  He  is  behaving                         
improperly  because  he  is  violating  the  norm  prohibiting  him  from  inquiring  into                         
what  he  already  knows.  An  utterance  like  (1)  is  incoherent  because  it  self-ascribes  a                             3
violation  of  IGN.   
A  norm  generates  primary  and  secondary  propriety  (Williamson  2000,  DeRose                     
2002,  a.o.).  The  primary  impropriety  of  a  prohibitive  norm  is  a  failing  to  abide  by  the                                
prohibition.  A  secondary  impropriety  is  an  agent’s  being  justified  in  believing  they                         
are  failing  to  abide  by  the  norm.  For  any  norm,  one  ought  not  do  what  one  is  justified                                     
in  regarding  as  a  violation  of  the  norm.  Applied  to  IGN,  an  agent’s  act  is  primarily                                 
improper  when  the  agent  inquires  into  a  Q  for  which  they  know  p Q ,  and  an  act  is                                   
secondarily  improper  when  they  inquire  into  a  Q  and  justifiably  believe  they  know                           
p Q .  Accordingly,  IGN  rules  out  not  only  those  inquiries  where  inquirers  already  know                           
what  the  answer  is,  but  also  those  inquiries  where  inquiry  justifiably  believe  that                           
they  are  in  such  a  position.     
In  addition  to  expanding  the  zone  of  impermissible  inquiry,  the                     
primary/secondary  distinction  provides  clarity  about  which  violations  of  IGN  are                     
2  The  proceeding  discussion  does  not  require  us  to  take  a  side  on  what  questions  are.  But  it  might                                       
help  some  readers  to  consider  a  Hamblin-style  semantics  on  which  an  interrogative  denotes  a  set  of                                 
propositions  that  are  its  candidate  answers.  A  complete  answer  to  a  question  is  then  a  proposition                                 
that  entails  the  truth  or  falsity  of  every  proposition  in  that  set.  In  contrast,  a  partial  answer  is  one  that                                         
entails  the  truth  or  falsity  of  only  some  propositions  in  that  alternative  set.     
3  Whitcomb  (2017)  goes  a  step  further  to  defend  that  IGN  is  a  constitutive  norm  that  individuates                                   
a  speech  act  of  asking.  However,  we  are  generally  skeptical  that  speech  acts  are  individuated  by                                 
constitutive  norms.  For  reasons  to  be  skeptical  that  assertion  is  individuated  by  a  constitutive  norm                               
that  apply  to  asking  as  a  speech  act,  see  Maitra  (2011)  and  Kelp  and  Simion  (2020).     
2   
typically  excusable.  Let  well-intentioned  inquiry  name  inquiries  wherein  an                   
agent  violates  IGN  primarily  but  not  secondarily  because  they  falsely  yet  justifiably                         
believe  they  do  not  know.  Typically,  well-intentioned  inquiry  is  excusable.  IGN  is                         4
violated  but  agents  are  still  doing  their  best.     
An  illustration  is  provided  by  considering  a  potential  counterexample.  Archer                     
(2018,  601-604)  observes  that  an  agent  who  knows  p Q  can  wonder  Q  without  being                             
blameworthy  if  their  knowledge  is  not  “cognitively  available.”  He  thereby  concludes                      
that  IGN  is  no  norm  at  all.  But  that  conclusion  is  too  quick  given  the                               
primary/secondary  distinction.  An  alternate  explanation  is  that  the  agent  is  not                       
blameworthy  because  they  are  well-intentioned.  They  are  not  like  Nikolai  who  is                         
aware  that  he  knows  but  inquires  anyway.  From  their  point  of  view,  their  inquisitive                             
behavior  is  coherent  and  natural.     5
IGN  is  far  from  being  the  most  surprising  norm  on  inquiry.  But  it  provides  a                               
starting  point  from  which  to  explore  which  epistemic  positions  are  compatible  with                         
inquiry  guided  by  IAs.  Consider  a  particular  epistemic  position  V  like  having  a                           
hunch,  believing,  having  justified  belief,  being  nearly  certain,  and  so  on.  If  V -ing  p Q                             
is  defective  or  improper  while  inquiring  into  Q ,  then  there  is  plausibly  a  norm                             
prohibiting  as  much.  That  norm  would  fill  out  the  schema  below  by  replacing  V  with                               
the  position  being  considered.   
norm  schema     
One  ought  not  inquire  into  Q  at  t  and  V  p Q   at  t .     
In  this  paper,  we  defend  that  inquiry  is  permissible  alongside  every  epistemic                         
position  that’s  not  already  ruled  impermissible  by  IGN.  That  is,  we  argue  for  IGN’s                             6
exhaustivity.  There  is  no  true  instance  of  the  norm  schema  where  V  stands  in  for  a                                 
position  that  is  not  knowledge.  As  long  as  an  agent’s  position  falls  short  of                             
knowledge  and  the  agent  is  not  justified  in  taking  themselves  to  know,  inquiry  into  a                               
particular  question  is  permissible.     
To  make  our  case,  Friedman  (2019a)  is  our  point  of  departure.  She  defends  an                             
instance  of  the  norm  schema  where  full  belief  in  p Q  is  improper  with  inquiry  into  Q .                                 
The  same  norm  is  also  endorsed  by  McGrath  (forthcoming)  and  defended  by  Millson                           
(forthcoming).   
don’t  believe  and  inquire  (DBI)    
4  A  nearby  notion  is  well-intentioned  termination .  Though  IGN,  as  a  wide-scope  norm,  is                             
silent  on  when  to  initiate  or  terminate  inquiry,  one  might  propose  a  norm  according  to  which  one                                   
must  terminate  inquiry  only  when  one  knows  a  complete  answer.  Well-intentioned  terminating                         
would  then  be  when  one  stops  inquiring  because  they  believe  they  know  an  answer.  Whitcomb  (2010,                                 
677-678)  endorses  such  a  termination  norm  and  convincingly  argues  that  Gettiered  inquirers  are                           
well-intentioned.  They  terminate  inquiry  impermissibly,  but  their  epistemic  wrong-doing  is  excusable                       
because  they  are  justified  in  believing  they  know.   
5  This  reply  pairs  well  with  a  responsibility-based  conception  of  self-knowledge.  If  awareness  of                             
one’s  attitudes  involves  regarding  them  as  commitments  or  states  for  which  one  is  responsible  (Burge                               
1996,  Bilgram  2006),  attitudes  of  which  one  is  unaware  are  not  attitudes  that  one  can  attempt  to  bring                                     
into  compliance  with  norms  on  inquiry.   
6  IGN  is  compatible  with  an  array  of  stronger  epistemic  norms  such  as  norms  prohibiting  inquiry                                 
into  what  we  know  we  know  or  into  what  is  certain  for  us.  But  given  standard  thinking  about                                     
higher-order  knowledge  and  certainty,  the  stronger  norms  will  just  prohibit  a  proper  subset  of  the                               
actions  IGN  already  prohibits.   For  this  reason,  we  ignore  stronger  norms.   
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One  ought  not  inquire  into  Q  at  t  and  believe  p Q   at  t .     
The  existence  of  DBI  is  incompatible  with  our  contention  that  IGN  is  exhaustive.                           
Our  plan  is  to  present  two  objections  to  DBI,  and  then  to  show  how  those  objections                                 
generalize.      
Our  first  objection  to  DBI  involves  cases  of  hedging.  When  speakers  hedge,  they                           
can  believe  p Q  even  while  properly  inquiring  into  Q .  DBI  mishandles  such  cases  by                             
predicting  they  are  impermissible.  The  second  objection  is  that,  if  the  goal  of  inquiry                             
is  to  know  a  complete  answer,  then  IGN  but  not  DBI  elucidates  why  inquiry  and  the                                 
epistemic  position  identified  by  each  are  jointly  improper.  Each  objection  motivates                       
our  broader  thesis  that  IGN  is  exhaustive:  inquiry  with  positions  weaker  than                         
knowledge  is  permissible,  at  least  in  cases  where  such  inquiry  isn’t  secondarily                         
improper  from  the  point  of  view  of  IGN.   
Here  is  how  we  proceed.  In  §2,  we  consider  the  data  which  Friedman  (2019a)                             
provides  to  motivate  DBI,  and  argue  that  IGN  explains  the  data  as  well.  Hence  there                               
is  no  explanatory  need  to  posit  an  additional  norm  beyond  IGN.  Next,  in  §3,  we  argue                                 
that  DBI  but  not  IGN  mishandles  hedging.  In  §4,  we  present  our  second  objection  to                               
DBI  related  to  the  goal  of  inquiry.  We  conclude  in  §5  by  discussing  how  our                               
objections  to  DBI  apply  to  other  norms  prohibiting  an  agent  from  inquiring  while                           
occupying  an  epistemic  position  weaker  than  knowledge.   
2.  Belief  and  inquiry   
Friedman  (2019 a )  motivates  DBI  on  the  basis  of  its  ability  to  explain  contrasting                           
cases,  infelicitous  discourses,  and  high-stakes  cases.  In  this  section,  we  briefly                       
canvass  this  data  and  argue  that  IGN  explains  the  data  just  as  well.  Accordingly,                             
there  is  zero  reason  to  posit  DBI  in  addition  to  IGN.     
2.1  Inspector  Morse   
Friedman  presents  three  cases  in  which  an  Inspector  Morse  occupies  a  different                         
position  towards  a  proposition  p Q :  ignorance,  knowledge,  and  false  belief.  For  each,                         
she  considers  whether  it  would  be  proper  for  Morse  to  also  have  an  IA  towards  Q .                                 
The  idea  is  that  by  learning  whether  a  position  is  compatible  with  an  IA,  we  also                                 
learn  whether  it  is  compatible  with  inquiry.  Friedman’s  key  claim  is  that  having  an                             
IA  is  proper  when  Morse’s  attitude  is  ignorance,  but  improper  when  Morse’s  attitude                           
is  knowledge  or  belief.  DBI  captures  as  much.   
That  is  her  case-based  argument.  But  let’s  move  more  slowly  and  consider  the                           
cases.     
Normal  Morse   
Morse  is  woken  up  by  his  telephone  ringing  in  the  early  hours  of  the  morning  –  a  doctor                                     
in  Oxford  has  been  shot  through  her  window  while  having  dinner  last  night.  Morse  pulls                               
himself  together  and  heads  to  the  scene  of  the  crime.  This  is  a  normal  case  for  Morse  and                                     
he  engages  in  a  perfectly  normal  inquiry  into  who  killed  the  doctor.  He  searches  the                              
scene,  talks  to  potential  witnesses,  and  so  on.  Then  he  discovers  that  the  doctor  was                               
having  an  affair  with  the  master  of  Lonsdale  College,  so  he  takes  his  investigation  over  to                                 
the  college.  And  things  go  as  expected  there  as  well:  he  talks  to  more  people,  does  more                                   
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looking  around,  draws  a  few  inferences,  stops  at  the  pub  and  eventually  solves  the  crime                               
(Friedman  2019 a ,  300).   
In  this  case,  Morse  doesn’t  know  who  killed  the  Oxfordian  doctor.  As  such,  Friedman                            
notes  that  it  is  proper  to  imagine  him  wondering  who  the  killer  was.  Our  reaction  to                                 
the  case  is  evidence  that  ignorance  toward  the  complete  answer  to  a  question  is                             
compatible  with  an  IA  towards  that  question.     
The  next  Morse  case  —  call  it  knowing  morse  —  is  just  like  the  first  one,                                 
save  for  one  big  difference:  Morse  himself  is  the  killer,  and  he’s  desperate  to  cover  up                                 
his  tracks  while  appearing  to  conduct  an  investigation.  Friedman  again  asks  whether                          
Morse  can  properly  adopt  an  IA  toward  who  killed  the  doctor.  For  this  case,  however,                               
she  does  not  think  he  can.  A er  all,  it  is  hard  to  understand  how  this  second  Morse                                   
could  coherently  wonder  who  the  murderer  is,  given  that  he  already  knows  that                           
murderer  is  he  himself.  IAs  such  as  wonder  or  curiosity  do  not  sit  nicely  with  the  fact                                   
Morse  knows.  Our  reaction  to  knowing  morse  is  evidence  that  knowing  the                         
complete  answer  to  a  question  is  incompatible  with  an  IA.   
The  final  case  is  believing  morse.  It  is  like  the  second  but  with  a  twist.                                 
Morse  again  wakes  up  believing  that  he  killed  the  doctor  in  Oxford,  but  in  fact  it’s  all                                   
an  illusion  that  is  a  result  of  “pseudo-memories  implanted  in  his  mind  by  a  cra y  old                                 
nemesis”.  Though  Morse  believes  he  knows  who  the  murderer  is,  that  in  fact  isn’t  so                               
(Friedman  2019 a ,  301) .  Once  more,  Friedman  asks  whether  it  is  proper  for  Morse  to                             
have  an  IA  toward  the  investigative  question.  And  again,  as  with  the  last  case,  the                               
verdict  is  negative.  Thus  it  would  seem  that  having  an  IA  is  improper  with  both                               
knowledge  of  the  complete  answer,  as  is  evidenced  by  knowing  morse ,  and  belief                           
in  the  complete  answer,   as  is  evidenced  by  believing  morse .      
believing  morse  helps  explain  why  Friedman  proposes  DBI.  Whereas  both                     
norms  explain  why  Morse  having  an  IA  in  knowing  morse  does  not  seem  proper,                             
Friedman  regards  DBI  as  having  an  easier  time  explaining  why  Morse  having  an  IA                             
in  believing  morse  is  improper.  But  Morse’s  predicament  can  be  explained  by                         
IGN  via  the  primary/secondary  distinction  introduced  at  the  start  of  this  paper.  Were                          
Morse  to  have  an  IA  in  believing  morse ,  he  would  violate  IGN  in  a  secondary                               
manner.  We  submit  that  he  justifiably  believes  he  knows  a  complete  answer  to  his                             
inquiry  because  of  the  pseudo-memories  planted  into  his  head.  As  a  result,  inquiring                           
into  who  killed  the  doctor  would  place  him  in  the  improper  position  of  possessing  an                               
IA  while  believing  he  knows  the  answer.     
2.2  Defective  discourses   
Friedman’s  second  argument  for  DBI  stems  from  the  infelicity  of  discourses  pairing                         
an  assertion  that  p Q  with  an  IA  directed  at  Q .  The  examples  Friedman  (2019 a ,  305)                               
gives  are  (2)  through  (4)  below.     
(2) #  Morse  killed  the  doctor,  but  I  wonder  who  killed  the  doctor  (/whether  Morse                             
killed  the  doctor/  …  )   
(3) #  All  four  Beatles  went  to  the  party,  but  I’m  curious  about  which  Beatles  went                               
to  the  party  (/whether  all  four  Beatles  went/  …  )   
5   
(4) #  We  should  turn  right  here,  but  I’m  deliberating  about  which  way  we  should                             
turn  (/whether  we  should  turn  right  here/  …  )   
Each  discourse  is  defective  while  still  being  meaningful  and  grammatical.  That                       
defectiveness  plausibly  traces  back  to  the  epistemic  position  they  publicize.  Speakers                       
who  utter  such  discourses  are  not  epistemically  behaving  as  they  should.  We  need  an                             
explanation  for  why.  Friedman  adopts  the  common  view  that  assertions  express                       
belief.  Consequently,  a  person  who  asserts  p Q  while  disclosing  that  they  have  an  IA                             
toward  Q  reports  they  believe  the  complete  answer  to  the  question  into  which  they                             
are  inquiring.  The  discourses  are  defective  because  they  state  outright  that  DBI  is                           
violated  by  the  speaker.     
But  IGN  enables  a  similar  explanation  with  a  minor  adjustment.  The  adjustment                         
is  a  familiar  one  from  the  literature  on  assertion:  the  first  conjunct  represents  the                             
speaker  as  knowing  as  opposed  to  merely  believing.  (2),  (3),  and  (4)  are  thereby                             
defective  because  the  speaker  is  indicating  they  are  violating  the  prohibition  to  not                           
inquire  and  know  a  complete  answer.     
2.3  High  stakes  cases   
The  final  source  of  data  involves  high  stakes  cases  where  it  is  practically  important                             
that  an  agent  correctly  answer  a  question.  Friedman  (2019 a )  identifies  three  key                         
features  of  such  cases.  First,  subjects  in  high  stakes  cases  are  subjects  who  must                             
double-check  their  preliminary  answers  to  a  question.  Call  this  the                     
double-checking  condition .  Second,  subjects  in  high  stakes  cases  are  in  weak                      
epistemic  circumstances.  Call  this  the  weakness  condition .  Both  features  seem                     
to  be  genuine  elements  of  familiar  high  stakes  cases.   
For  an  illustration  of  these  features,  consider  a  variant  on  the  story  of  Hannah,  a                               
person  whose  financial  woes  were  first  documented  by  DeRose  (1992).     
Changing  Stakes  Hannah   
Hannah  wants  to  know  if  the  bank  will  be  open  on  Sunday  or  whether  she  ought  to                                  
cancel  her  meeting  and  go  today.  She  remembers  that  she  was  able  to  go  to  the  bank  on                                     
Sunday  a  few  months  ago.  The  memory  makes  her  rest  easy  and  she  resolves  not  to                                 
cancel  the  meeting.  But  then  she  remembers  that  it  is  very  important  that  she  cash  her                                
check  by  Sunday  because  she  recently  used  her  new  credit  card  to  go  on  book-buying                               
binge  in  Boston.  Given  the  stakes  of  the  situation,  she  decides  to  double  check  the  bank’s                                 
hours  of  operation  by  going  to  the  bank’s  website  on  her  phone.  Sure  enough  the  bank’s                                 
website  reports  that  the  bank  will  be  open.  Hannah  breathes  a  sigh  of  relief,  and  jumps                                 
on  her  motorcycle  to  go  to  her  meeting.   
Both  of  the  features  highlighted  above  are  elements  of  changing  stakes                       
hannah .  Even  though  Hannah  initially  arrived  at  the  belief  that  the  bank  will  be                             
open  on  Sunday,  her  subsequent  recognition  of  the  high  stakes  led  her  to                           
double-check.  Her  grounds  for  double-checking  seem  to  be  rational  in  part  because                         
her  recognition  of  the  stakes  of  her  situation  weakened  her  epistemic  situation.  She                           
consequently  needed  more  evidence  than  just  her  memory.   
The  third  feature  is  perhaps  more  controversial  than  the  other  two  features.                         
Friedman  (2019 a ,  305)  maintains  that  subjects  in  high  stakes  cases  who  have  to                           
double  check  the  answer  to  a  question  shouldn’t  regard  any  answer  to  that  question                             
as  true  until  they  finish  double  checking.  Call  this  the  suspending  condition .                         
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Consider  Hannah  in  changing  stakes  hannah  just  before  she  double-checks                     
the  bank’s  hours  on  her  phone.  Friedman  judges  that  prior  to  double-checking,                         
Hannah  shouldn’t  have  a  belief  in  a  complete  answer.     
To  explain  such  a  case,  Friedman  (2019 a ,  305)  assumes  an  additional  principle.                         
The  principle  is  a  conditional  with  DBI  as  a  conjunct  in  its  antecedent.     
Obligatory  inquiry   
If  one  ought  not  both  inquire  into  Q  at  t  and  believe  p Q  at  t  (i.e.  DBI),  and  one  ought  to                                           
inquire  into  Q  at  t ,  then  one  ought  not  believe  p Q   at  t .   
Friedman’s  strategy  is  to  use  double-checking  condition  in  concert  with  this                       
principle  and  DBI  to  explain  the  suspending  and  weakness  conditions .  Here’s                       
how  it  goes.  As  per  the  double-checking  condition ,  Hannah  should                     
double-check.  Given  DBI,  the  antecedent  to  the  conditional  is  then  satisfied.                       
Accordingly,  Hannah  should  not  believe  her  prior  answer  to  whether  the  bank  is                           
open.  DBI  therefore  helps  explain  two  of  the  highlighted  conditions.  First,  DBI                         
explains  the  suspending  condition  with  the  help  of  the  conditional  principle                       
and  the  double-checking  condition .  Second,  DBI  thereby  explains  the                   
weakness  condition .  Since  agents  who  have  been  compelled  to  suspend  belief                       
are  in  weaker  epistemic  circumstances  than  agents  who  are  permitted  to  still  believe                           
an  answer,  DBI  explains  the  weakness  condition  as  a  consequence  of  its  having                           
first  explained  the  suspending  condition .   
Since  knowledge  requires  belief,  IGN  in  conjunction  with  obligatory  inquiry                     
can  explain  both  the  weakness  and  suspending  conditions  in  the  same  manner.  But                           
we  want  to  explore  another  explanation.  We  are  not  convinced  that  the  suspending                           
condition  is  a  genuine  feature  of  every  high  stakes  case.  Consider  the  following                           
modification  to  the  case.   
Hesitant  Hannah   
Hannah  wants  to  know  if  the  bank  will  be  open  on  Sunday  or  whether  she  ought                                 
to  cancel  her  meeting  and  go  today.  She  remembers  going  to  the  bank  on  Sunday                               
a  while  ago,  but  knows  that  the  stakes  of  the  situation  are  high.  So  she  decides  to                                   
double  check  the  bank’s  hours  of  operation  by  going  to  the  bank’s  website  on  her                               
phone.  At  that  very  moment,  Hannah’s  friend  Ari  calls.  Ari  asks  Hannah  if  she                             
thinks  the  bank  will  be  open  on  Sunday.  Hannah  responds  as  follows:   
(5) I  believe  that  it  is.  But  there  is  a  lot  that  hangs  on  being  right,  at  least  for  me,                                       
so  I  was  just  now  going  to  double-check  on  their  website.  I  will  message  you  if                                 
they’re  closed.   
In  the  situation  described,  Hannah  retains  her  belief  that  the  bank  will  be  open  on                               
Sunday  even  though  she  is  in  the  midst  of  double-checking  as  much.  Accordingly,                           
high  stakes  cases  do  not  mandate  that  an  agent  like  Hannah  drop  her  belief.  So  we  do                                   
not  think  a  norm  like  DBI  or  IGN  has  to  explain  the  suspending  condition ,                             
especially  by  way  of  an  auxiliary  principle  about  obligation.   
Even  if  the  suspending  condition  is  not  a  genuine  feature  of  high  stakes                           
cases,  the  reply  might  be  given  that  double-checking  o en  correlates  with  the  agent                           
dropping  her  original  belief.  Perhaps  DBI  can  better  help  explain  the  correlation.                         
A er  all,  it  is  easy  to  imagine  Hannah  in  the  original  case  dropping  her  belief  a er                                 
realizing  that  it  is  important  to  know  the  answer  to  her  question.     
7   
IGN  is  similarly  helpful  in  explaining  the  correlation  due  to  how  belief  and                          
knowledge  themselves  correlate.  First,  dropping  belief  correlates  with  dropping                   
knowledge.  Since  knowledge  requires  belief,  dropping  belief  in  a  complete  answer                       
drops  knowledge  too.  Second,  dropping  knowledge  o en  correlates  with  dropping                     
belief.  Consider  Changing  Stakes  Hannah  once  more.  Hannah’s  realization  that                     
the  stakes  are  higher  than  she  thought  leads  her  to  reevaluate  whether  she  knows                             
whether  the  bank  is  open  on  Sunday.  Where  once  she  thought  she  knew  as  much,  she                                 
now  is  less  confident.  That  change  is  brought  about  by  her  awareness  of  the  stakes.                               
The  particularities  of  how  the  latter  leads  to  the  former  are  very  controversial  and                             
not  something  we  need  to  adjudicate.  Regardless  of  how  they  are  understood,  the                           
process  that  leads  Hannah  to  doubt  that  her  belief  counts  as  knowledge  will  o en                             
lead  her  to  drop  the  belief  altogether.  For  example,  suppose  Hannah  stops  taking                           
herself  to  know  because  she  regards  her  evidence  as  weaker  than  initially  thought.                           
Regarding  her  evidence  as  weaker  will  o en  prompt  her  to  stop  believing  simpliciter                           
that  the  bank  is  open.     
3.  Hedged  belief  and  inquiry   
We  now  turn  to  the  case  against  DBI.  The  first  is  related  to  the  role  played  by                                   
hedging  in  joint  inquiry.  We  defend  two  main  claims.  The  first  is  that  hedged                             
statements  can  entail  that  the  speaker  believes  a  proposition.  The  second  is  that                           
hedged  statements  do  not  settle  inquiry.  DBI’s  mistake  is  that  it  predicts  certain                          
instances  of  hedging  to  be  epistemically  improper  when  they  are  not.     
3.1  Hedging  and  belief   
Hedging  is  o en  characterized  as  weakened  commitment  or  diminished                   
responsibility  to  a  proposition  expressed  (Fraser  2010,  McCready  2015,  Benton  and                       
van  Elswyk  2020).  For  the  purpose  of  this  paper,  we  offer  less  committal                           
characterization  in  terms  of  the  strength  with  which  a  speaker  presents  a                         
proposition.  A  speaker  hedges  by  using  a  declarative  sentence  that  contains  an                         
epistemic  term  that  participants  understand  as  weakening  the  strength  with  which                       
the  speaker  presents  the  proposition  expressed.  In  a  slogan,  hedges  attenuate                       
presentational  strength.  That  strength  may  or  may  not  essentially  involve  normative                       
notions.  On  that  we  do  not  take  a  side.     
Our  sole  focus  is  on  the  attitude  verb  believe .  It  can  be  used  to  hedge  in  either  a                                     7
matrix  or  parenthetical  position.  In  a  matrix  position,  the  hedging  use  is  easiest  to                             
detect  in  a  question-answer  discourse.  To  illustrate,  compare  the  following                     
exchanges.     
7  A  speaker  can  hedge  without  using  an  attitude  verb.  Likewise,  a  speaker  can  hedge  without                                 
using  believe .  We  focus  on  believe  to  have  a  clear,  unambiguous  counterexample  to  DBI.  For  example,                                 
Millson  (forthcoming)  presents  a  challenge  for  DBI  involving  confirmation-seeking  expressions  as                       
opposed  to  hedging  expressions.  His  way  around  the  challenge  is  to  deny  Lockeanism  about  belief  and                                 
maintain  that  confirmation-seeking  expressions  express  credences  as  opposed  to  full  belief  in  a                           
proposition.  No  similar  response  will  be  available  here  because  hedging  with  believe  entails  speaker                             
belief.  Admittedly,  hedging  with  believe  is  less  common  than  hedging  with  think .  But  there  is  reason  to                                   
think  believe  is  as  weak  as  think .  See  Hawthorne  et  al  (2016)  and  Rothschild  (forthcoming).  Then                                 
think -based  examples  would  be  equally  problematic  for  DBI.      
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(6) Do  you  believe  there  is  le over  milk?     
(7) I  believe  that  there  is  le over  milk.     
(8) Is  there  le over  milk?     
(9) I  believe  that  there  is  le over  milk.     
Sentences  (7)  and  (9)  are  identical  in  appearance,  but  the  contribution  of  believe  can                             
be  interpreted  differently.  In  reply  to  (6),  a  question  explicitly  about  the  speaker’s                           
beliefs,  believe  does  not  weaken  strength.  It  contributes  to  the  speaker’s  primary                         
contribution.  However,  believe  can  be  understood  differently  in  (9).  The  question  it                         8
answers  is  not  about  the  speaker’s  beliefs.  What  is  the  primary  contribution  of  (9)  is                               
that  there  is  le over  milk,  and  believe  weakens  the  strength  with  which  the  speaker                             
presents  that  contribution.   
A  parenthetical  verb  differs  from  a  matrix  verb  in  that  it  can  appear  in  either  an                                 
initial,  medial,  or  sentence-final  position.  Believe  is  one  of  the  attitude  verbs  that  can                             
occupy  a  parenthetical  position.  (10)  and  (11)  are  answers  to  (6).     
(10)  There  is,  I  believe,  le over  milk.     
(11)  There  is  le over  milk,  I  believe.     
Like  the  instance  of  believe  in  (7),  the  instances  in  (10)  and  (11)  can  be  interpreted  as                                   
not  contributing  to  what  the  speaker  is  putting  on  the  record.  When  interpreted  in                             
such  a  way,  they  are  interpreted  as  hedges  that  weaken  the  strength  of  presentation.     
It  is  a  platitude  that  believe  in  matrix  position  within  a  declarative  entails  that  the                               
sentence’s  subject  believes.  Believe -parentheticals  are  trickier  because  their                 
contribution  is  clearly  different  from  believe  in  matrix  position.  But  they  still  entail                           
subject  belief.  If  believe- parentheticals  did  not,  we  could  construct  felicitous                     
discourses  consisting  of  two  parts:  first,  a  statement  that  p  qualified  with  a                           
believe -parenthetical  and,  second,  a  disavowal  of  belief  in  p .  However,  we  cannot.                        
Discourses  like  (12)  are  contradictions.     
(12)  #  There  is  le over  milk,  I  believe.  But  I  don’t  believe  that  there  is  le over                                 
milk.     
That  such  a  contradiction  is  expressible  is  evidence  that  the  believe -parenthetical  is                         
entering  into  entailment  relations  with  the  believe  in  matrix  position  in  the                         
discourse.  Indeed,  every  compositional  semantics  for  parenthetical  verbs  we  are                     9
8  We  take  the  data  to  sufficiently  motivate  that  believe  in  matrix  position  can  be  interpreted  as  a                                     
hedge  and  remain  neutral  on  how  best  to  explain  how  it  is  interpreted  as  such.  Presumably,  the                                   
hedging  interpretation  is  arrived  at  pragmatically.  The  agent  asking  (6)  recognizes  that  (7)  is  not  an                                 
answer  in  a  strict  sense.  Assuming  a  Hamblin  semantics  for  questions,  for  example,  (7)  does  not  entail                                   
the  truth  or  falsity  of  any  of  the  propositions  in  (6)’s  denotation.  The  asking  agent  then  attempts  to                                     
discern  why  the  speaker  of  (7)  would  have  said  what  they  did.  The  hedging  interpretation  will  o en  be                                     
the  best  explanation.   
9  A  referee  suggests  an  alternative  diagnosis.  If  the  negation  in  the  continuation  is  interpreted  in                                 
the  embedded  clause  (i.e.  neg-raising),  then  (12)  could  be  paraphrased  as  this:  There  is  le over  milk,  I                                   
believe,  but  I  believe  there  is  not  le over  milk.  This  does  not  express  a  contradiction.  Instead,  it  expresses                                     
that  the  speaker  is  in  an  irrational  state.  With  this  diagnosis,  one  might  argue  that                               
believe -parentheticals  actually  expresses  an  attitude  weaker  than  belief  like  suspicion.  A er  all,  it                           
would  still  be  defective  to  suspect  what  you  believe  is  false.  However,  the  neg-raising  interpretation                               
can  be  blocked  and  a  contradiction  still  results.  The  easiest  way  to  block  neg-raising  is  to  add                                   
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aware  of  assigns  them  meanings  in  which  they  entail  that  the  speaker  occupies  the                             
attitude  or  epistemic  position  indicated  by  the  parenthetical  verb.   10
Our  objection  does  not  require  more  to  be  said  about  what  it  means  for  epistemic                               
terms  to  weaken  the  strength  with  which  a  proposition  is  expressed.  Nor  does  it                             
require  the  details  of  how  that  weakening  effect  is  linguistically  produced.  Specifying                         
as  much  requires  a  complete  epistemology  and  semantics  for  hedging  and  offering  as                           
much  is  not  our  aim.  Whatever  the  finer  details  of  hedging,  the  examples  above  show                               
that  the  verb  believe  is  used  to  hedge  and  that  such  uses  of  the  verb  entail  that  the                                     
speaker  believes.     11
3.2  Hedging  and  inquiry   
The  idea  that  hedged  statements  do  not  settle  inquiry  can  be  found  in  Adler’s  (2006,                               
235)  brief  discussion  of  qualified  assertions:     
Epistemically  qualified  assertions  are  not  truly  assertions.  Toulmin  captured  this  crucial                       
point  without,  however,  developing  it:  “To  say  ‘Probably  p ’  is  to  assert  guardedly,  and/or                             
with  reservations,  that  p  (1950:  85).”  Since  the  central  aim  of  the  exchange  is  to  transmit                                 
the  information  that  p  (all-or-none),  the  qualified  expression  (manifestly)  falls  short.  If                         
Harry  asks  Sally  “Whose  turn  is  it  to  walk  the  dog?”  and  Sally  responds  “I’m  pretty  sure                                   
it's  your  turn,”  the  task  remains  unsettled.  Sally’s  guarded  assertion  is  acknowledgement                         
of  unsuccessful  communication.   
In  contrast  to  unqualified  statements,  hedged  statements  leave  inquiry  unresolved.                     
Consider  each  side  of  Adler’s  example.  On  the  speaker’s  side,  hedging  enables  Sally                           
to  not  determine  for  Harry  whose  turn  it  is  to  walk  the  dog.  Notice  that,  if  she  is                                     
intonational  focus  onto  the  matrix  verb  (Gajewski  2007,  Romoli  2013).  When  added  to  (12),  infelicity                               
still  results.     
  
(12)*  #  There  is  le over  milk,  I  believe.  But  I  don’t  [believe] F   that  there  is  le over  milk.   
  
Additionally,  the  insertion  of  a  temporal  adverb  like  still  between  negation  and  believe  also                             
problematizes  neg-raising.   
  
(12)**  #  There  is  le over  milk,  I  believe.  But  I  don’t  still  believe  there  is  le over  milk.   
  
Interpreted  with  neg-raising,  the  continuation  (12)**  states  that  the  speaker  still  believes  there  is  not                               
le over  milk.  But  that  interpretation  is  hard  to  access.  Finally,  we  can  construct  a  similar                               
contradiction  without  negation.   
    
(12)***  #  There  is  le over  milk,  I  believe.  But  I  refrain  from  believing  there  is  le over  milk.   
  
The  phrase  refrain  from  replaces  negation  in  (12***).  This  phrase  does  not  license  a  raised                               
interpretation  but  still  yields  a  contradiction.  An  agent  cannot  both  V  and  refrain  from  V -ing.  These                                 
considerations  show  that  the  alternative  diagnosis  is  not  as  explanatory  as  the  straightforward                           
proposal  that  believe- parentheticals  express  belief.     
10  See  Asher  (2000),  Murray  (2017),  and  van  Elswyk  (forthcoming).     
11  It  is  important  to  distinguish  what  hedging  can  reflect  about  the  speaker’s  position  and  what                                 
hedged  testimony  may  entitle  for  a  hearer.  We  have  defended  that  a  speaker  can  hedge  and  believe.                                   
This  is  fully  compatible  with  hedged  testimony  not  entitling  full  belief.  For  example,  Jackson  (2020,                               
§3.3)  suggests  that  hedged  testimony  only  entitles  a  hearer  to  adjust  their  credences  as  opposed  to                                 
forming  a  full  belief  in  what  is  stated.     
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wrong  about  whose  turn  it  is  and  Harry  learns  as  much  by  checking  past  text                               
message  conversations,  she  is  not  fully  responsible  for  the  wrong  answer.  She  can                           
always  defend  herself  by  pointing  out  that  she  didn’t  speak  without  qualification.  She                           
said  merely  she  was  “pretty  sure.”  As  a  result,  Harry  is  at  least  partially  responsible                               
for  treating  “I’m  pretty  sure  it's  your  turn”  as  settling.  He  took  a  non-settling  answer                               
and  treated  it  as  if  it  were  a  settling  answer.   
On  the  hearer’s  side,  the  hedge  has  a  similar  effect.  Since  the  qualified                           
statement  does  not  settle  inquiry,  it  invites  Harry  to  seek  out  an  answer  based  upon                               
a  different  source  of  evidence.  Normally,  continuing  inquiry  a er  receiving  an                       
unqualified  answer  requires  rejecting  or  ignoring  the  person’s  conversational                   
contribution.  But  this  is  not  the  case  for  Harry.  Harry  had  continued  his  inquiry                             
a er  hearing  from  Sally  by  checking  their  past  text  message  conversations,  Harry                         
would  not  be  understood  as  ignoring  or  rejecting  Sally’s  contribution.  Her                       
contribution  would  be  treated  as  providing  evidence  relevant  to  the  question  but  as                           
falling  short  of  settling  his  inquiry.      12
That  hedged  statements  fail  to  settle  inquiry  can  further  be  illustrated  by                         
adjusting  the  example  with  which  we  began  this  paper.  In  the  process,  we  can  arrive                               
at  a  counterexample  to  DBI.     
Forgotten  Glasses   
Boris  Stepanovich’s  wife  Anna  Igorovna  asks  Boris  if  there’s  still  milk  in  the  fridge.  Boris                               
wonders  this  too.  So  he  opens  the  fridge  to  check.  However,  as  he  is  opening  the  fridge,                                   
he  realizes  that  he  has  forgotten  his  spectacles.  Boris  and  Anna  maintain  a  Good  Russian                               
Household,  and  therefore  consume  both  milk  and  kefir ,  a  dairy  product  that  is  housed  in                               
cartons  that  resembles  the  cartons  that  house  milk.  Boris  squints  and  comes  to  believe                             
that  the  carton  seen  in  the  fridge  contains  milk.  Nonetheless,  Boris  still  wonders  if                             
what’s  in  the  fridge  is  milk  rather  than  kefir.  So,  Boris  closes  the  fridge  and  says  to  Anna                                     
one  of  the  following:   
(13)  I  took  a  look  in  the  fridge.  I  believe  that  there  is  milk.  However,  I  forgot  my                                     
glasses  and  it  was  hard  to  tell  if  what  I  saw  was  milk  or  kefir.  So  I  don’t  really                                       
know.  I’m  gonna  find  my  glasses  and  then  check  again  whether  there  is  milk.   
(14)  I  took  a  look  in  the  fridge.  There  is  milk,  I  believe.  However,  I  forgot  my                                   
glasses  and  it  was  hard  to  tell  if  what  I  saw  was  milk  or  kefir.  So  I  don’t  really                                       
know.  I’m  gonna  find  my  glasses  and  then  check  again  whether  there  is  milk.   
There  is  nothing  defective  about  Boris’s  report  to  Anna.  Grammar  permits  him  to  say                             
as  much  and,  whatever  the  epistemic  norms  of  inquiry  are,  they  too  permit  him  to  act                                 
as  he  does.  Boris  conveys  that  his  inquiry  is  not  yet  over  through  hedging.     
Therein  lies  the  problem  for  DBI.  Whether  the  hedge  occurs  via  believe  in  a                             
matrix  like  (13)  or  parenthetical  position  like  (14),  Boris  can  express  belief  in  a                             
complete  answer  to  a  question  Q  and  still  permissibly  continue  inquiry  into  Q .  But                             
that  is  what  is  ruled  out  by  DBI.  It  mistakenly  predicts  that  the  epistemic  alarm  bells                                 
should  be  ringing  with  what  he  has  said  and  done.   
12  Both  of  these  observations  about  the  speaker  and  hearer  obtain  even  if  the  context  has                                 
incredibly  low  stakes.  This  suggests  that  hedged  assertions  are  not  on  enough  to  settle  inquiry                               
regardless  of  the  stakes.  To  be  sure,  Harry  could  proceed  as  if  Sally’s  reply  were  sufficient.  But,  in                                     
doing  so,  Harry  would  be  acting  in  a  way  that  goes  beyond  what  Sally  actually  contributed  to  the                                     
conversation.   
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Hedging  counterexamples  are  easily  reproducible.  The  last  example  was  a  polar                       
question  allowing  only  a  positive  or  negative  answer.  As  such,  Boris  expressed  belief                           
in  a  complete  answer  by  expressing  belief  in  any  direct  answer  to  the  question.                             
However,  we  can  illustrate  the  same  point  with  a  constituent  question  by  inserting                           
the  adverb  only  into  the  hedged  answer.     
New  Year’s  Party   
Nikolai  Mikhailovich  hosted  a  party  to  celebrate  the  start  of  the  new  year.  Anna                             
Igorovna,  who  didn’t  attend,  is  later  asked  by  a  mutual  acquaintance  about  who  attended                             
the  party  apart  from  Nikolai.  Anna  considers  the  question,  and  offers  one  of  these                             
replies:   
(15)  Only  Borya  was  at  the  party,  I  believe.  But  I  don’t  know  that.  So  I  can’t  help                                     
but  wonder  myself  which  people  attended  the  party.   
(16)  Only  Borya  was  at  the  party,  I  believe.  But  I  don’t  know  that.  So  let’s  ask                                   
Kolya,  the  party’s  host,  to  figure  out  who  was  at  the  party.   
The  above  discourses,  which  feature  parenthetical  verbs  as  opposed  to  matrix  ones,                         
represent  the  speaker  as  failing  to  comply  with  DBI.  For  they  each  represent  their                             
speaker  as  believing  a  complete  answer  to  a  question  they  are  still  actively  inquiring                             
into.  DBI  predicts  that  the  above  data  should  display  epistemic  impropriety.  And  yet,                           
what  Anna  states  is  beyond  reproach.     
In  a  footnote,  Friedman  (2019 a ,  313)  claims  that  sentences  of  the  form  “ S                           
thinks/believes  p  and  S  φ s  Q ”,  where  φ  stands  for  an  interrogative  attitude,  indicates                             
that  S  is  in  a  confused  state  and  not  “epistemically  thriving.”     13
(17)  ?  I  believe  there  is  le over  milk  and  I  wonder  whether  there  is  le over  milk.     
We  acknowledge  that  discourses  like  (17)  are  awkward.  But  they  are  difficult  to                           14
interpret  in  two  important  respects.  First,  the  contribution  of  believe  is  ambiguous.                         
We  cannot  tell  whether  the  verb  is  in  a  parenthetical  or  matrix  position  and,  if  the                                 
latter,  whether  the  verb  is  to  be  interpreted  as  a  hedge.  Second,  the  epistemic                             
position  of  the  speaker  is  not  clear.  Discourses  like  (17)  do  not  state  outright  that                               
IGN  is  violated.  But  given  the  primary/secondary  distinction,  (17)  might  still  reflect  a                           
violation  of  IGN  in  a  secondary  way  if  the  speaker  believes  they  know  there  is                               
le over  milk  and  still  wonders  if  there  is.     
For  these  reasons,  discourses  like  (17)  are  not  probative.  Only  when  what  is  le                              
open  by  (17)  gets  resolved  can  we  assess  whether  IGN  makes  accurate  predictions                           
about  felicity.  Fortunately,  IGN  does  predict  accurately  once  we  fill  in  the  blanks.                           
Compare  (17)  alongside  (16)  from  earlier.  In  (16),  believe  is  behaving  as  a  hedge                             
because  it  is  in  a  parenthetical  position.  Since  a  declarative  represents  the  speaker  as                             
believing  its  content,  But  I  don’t  know  that  clarifies  that  the  speaker  believes  they  do                               
not  know.  Accordingly,  the  speaker  is  not  in  a  situation  where  they  violate  IGN  in  a                                 
secondary  manner.   
13  Archer  (2018)  considers  discourses  like  I  am  wondering  whether  the  bank  is  open,  but  I  believe  it  is                                       
and  argues  that  they  problematize  the  thesis  defended  in  Friedman  (2017)  that  possessing  an                             
interrogative  attitude  requires  suspending  belief.  We  do  not  share  this  judgment.  We  submit  that  the                               
difference  between  his  discourses  and  (13)  and  (14)  is  that  the  latter  are  clearly  hedges.   
14  Note  that  (17)  improves  if  and  is  replaced  by  but .  Since  but  merely  indicates  contrast  between  the                                     
conjuncts,  (17)  is  at  least  partly  odd  for  reasons  having  nothing  to  do  with  inquiry.  
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(16)  Only  Borya  was  at  the  party,  I  believe.  But  I  don’t  know  that.  So  let’s  ask                                   
Kolya,  the  party’s  host,  to  figure  out  who  was  at  the  party.   
The  felicity  of  (16)  is  to  be  expected  given  IGN.  There  is  nothing  wrong  with                               
believing  p Q  and  inquiring  into  Q  as  long  as  one  does  not  take  one’s  belief  to                                 
constitute  knowledge.     
But  now  compare  (17)  to  (19).  The  believe  below  is  in  matrix  position  where  it  is                                 
not  a  hedge.  The  discourse  also  clarifies  that  the  speaker  believes  they  know  a                             
complete  answer  as  conveyed  by  the  continuation  “ In  fact,  I  know  that .”  As  a  result,                               
(19)  is  at  least  a  secondary  violation,  if  not  a  primary  violation.   
(18)  Do  you  believe  there  is  le over  milk?     
(19)  #  I  believe  that  there  is  le over  milk.  In  fact,  I  know  that.  But  I  wonder                                   
whether  there  is  le over  milk.     
So  another  way  of  filling  in  the  blanks  le   open  by  the  underspecified  (17)  pose  no                                 
problem  for  IGN.  The  above  is  predicted  to  be  infelicitous  by  IGN  as  a  secondary                               
violation.   
3.3  Knowledge  and  hedging   
DBI  mishandles  hedges  because  it  erroneously  predicts  that  hedged  statements  settle                       
inquiry  as  long  as  the  speaker  believes.  IGN  inherits  this  problem  only  if  hedges                             
entail  speaker  knowledge.  They  do  not.  Consider  (21)  and  (22).     
(20)  Who  was  at  the  party?     
(21)  I  know  that  only  Boris  was  at  the  party.     
(22)  #  Only  Boris  was  at  the  party,  I  know.     
(21)  is  felicitous  and  not  a  hedge  whereas  (22)  is  neither  felicitous  nor  a  hedge.  Unlike                                 
believe  in  our  earlier  examples,  (22)  shows  that  the  inclusion  of  know  in  matrix                             
position  is  not  interpreted  as  weakening  the  strength  with  which  the  proposition  is                           
presented.  In  a  parenthetical  position,  know  is  usually  infelicitous  (Slote  1979,                       
Rooryck  2001,  Benton  2011).  In  the  rare  case  it  is  not,  know -parentheticals  still  do  not                               
weaken  the  presentation  strength  of  the  statement.   
IGN  therefore  fairs  better  than  DBI  when  it  comes  to  hedging  because  hedges  do                             
not  express  knowledge.  More  than  that,  IGN  pairs  elegantly  with  the  view  of  hedging                             
found  in  Benton  and  van  Elswyk  (2020).  They  hold  that  hedges  weaken  the  strength                             
with  which  a  proposition  is  presented  by  representing  an  epistemic  position  weaker                         
than  knowledge.  The  use  of  an  unhedged  declarative  represents  the  speaker  as                         
knowing  the  proposition  expressed.  The  function  of  hedging  is  to  stop  or  eliminate                           
the  representation  of  knowledge  typically  by  representing  the  position  indicated  by                       
the  hedging  term.     
A  helpful  illustration  is  given  by  challenge  data.  How  participants  challenge                      
helps  reveal  what  epistemic  position  is  represented  by  a  declarative’s  utterance.                       
Williamson  (2000)  notes  that  challenges  to  (23)  like  (24)  support  the  claim  that                           
unhedged  declaratives  represent  speaker  knowledge.     
(23)  Only  Boris  was  at  the  party.     
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(24)  How  do  you  know  that?  /  You  don’t  know  that!   
However,  the  same  challenges  are  infelicitous  in  response  to  a  hedged  declarative                         
like  (25).     
(25)  Only  Boris  was  at  the  party,  I  think.     
(26)  #  How  do  you  know  that?  /  You  don’t  know  that!   
The  reason  why  is  that  knowledge  is  no  longer  represented.  Unlike  (23)  where  the                             
speaker  represents  themselves  as  knowing  that  only  Boris  was  at  the  party,  the                           
speaker  of  (25)  merely  represents  themselves  as  thinking  as  much.  The  proper                         
challenge  given  the  position  represented  would  be  Why  do  you  think  that?  or                           
something  analogous  that  corresponds  to  the  position  indicated  by  the  hedging  term                         
at  the  end  of  the  sentence.      
The  knowledge-centric  view  of  hedging  provides  further  clarity  about  why                     
hedged  discourses  are  felicitous.  A  hedged  statement  cannot  represent  knowledge.                     
So  a  hedged  discourse  never  states  a  primary  violation  of  IGN.  Additionally,  speakers                           
who  choose  to  hedge  choose  not  to  represent  knowledge.  Assuming  the  hedging  is                           
sincere  in  that  the  speaker  is  not  attempting  to  mislead  others  about  the  strength  of                               
their  epistemic  position,  hedging  is  usually  accompanied  with  a  belief  that  the                         
content  of  the  hedged  statement  is  not  known.  If  it  were,  the  speaker  would  have  not                                 
hedged.  So  a  hedged  discourse,  if  sincere,  does  not  qualify  as  a  secondary  violation                             
of  IGN  either.     
The  knowledge-centric  view  of  hedging  also  sheds  light  on  additional  data                       
favoring  the  explanatory  primacy  of  IGN.  In  discussing  which  epistemic  norms                       
might  constitute  the  speech  act  of  asking,  Whitcomb  (2017,  159)  presents  what  we                           
call  declining  data .  Where  V  once  again  stands  in  for  an  epistemic  position  like                             
having  a  hunch  or  strongly  believing,  consider  the  schematic  reply  below  for  a                           
question  Q.   
Decline  schema     
  I  can’t  answer  that.  But  I  V  that  the  answer  is  p Q .   
Not  every  way  of  filling  out  the  schema  produces  a  coherent  discourse.  Suppose  the                             
question  being  discussed  is  who  was  at  the  new  year’s  party,  as  set-up  by  new                               
year’s  party .  Replacing  V  with  knowledge  produces  incoherence.  Not  so  for                       
substitutions  of  V  that  specify  a  weaker  epistemic  position  not  prohibited  alongside                         
inquiry  by  IGN.     
(27)  #  I  can’t  answer  that.  But  I  know  that  the  answer  is  that  only  Borya  was.     
(28)  I  can’t  answer  that.  But  I  believe  that  the  answer  is  that  only  Borya  was.      
(29)  I  can’t  answer  that.  But  I  have  a  hunch  that  the  answer  is  that  only  Borya  was.   
Whitcomb  takes  the  data  as  evidence  that  IGN  as  opposed  to  a  weaker  norm                             
constitutes  a  speech  act  of  asking.     
But  note  that  the  declining  data  also  doubles  as  problematic  data  for  DBI.  Agents                             
who  cannot  answer  a  question  Q  are  agents  for  whom  Q  remains  open:  they’re                             
capable  of  further  inquiry  into  what  the  answer  is.  For  agents  in  such  situations,                             
therefore,  it  is  natural  to  characterize  such  openness  by  ascribing  interrogative                       
attitudes  to  them.  These  are  agents  who  still  wonder  and  are  curious.  But  if  their  still                                 
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being  capable  of  further  inquiry  is  what  motivates  the  judgment  that  it  is  coherent                             
that  they  cannot  answer  the  question  asked  of  them,  then  the  coherence  of  replies                             
(28)  and  (29)  are  additional  counterexamples  to  DBI.  IGN  confronts  no  difficulty                         
because  (27)  is  decidedly  incoherent.     
What  the  knowledge-centric  view  of  hedging  clarifies  is  why  the  various                       
completions  of  the  decline  schema  are  coherent  or  not.  Though  different  from                         
the  discourses  we  presented,  declining  discourses  that  complete  the  schema  qualify                       
as  hedged  discourses.  They  are  discourses  in  which  a  speaker  presents  an  answer  to                             
Q  but  attenuates  the  strength  with  which  that  answer  is  presented  by  indicating  that                             
they  occupy  a  position  weaker  than  knowledge.  Accordingly,  (27)  is  incoherent  for                         
the  reason  that  you  cannot  hedge  by  representing  knowledge.  Likewise,  (28)  and  (29)                           
are  coherent  because  they  are  interpreted  as  hedging  discourses.     
4.  The  aim  of  inquiry   
Wide-scope  norms  that  prohibit  being  in  a  particular  state  during  an  activity  require                           
further  explanation.  It  needs  to  be  detailed  what  it  is  about  the  states  or  activities                               
that  prohibits  their  joint  adoption.  Consider  the  prohibition  against  being  drunk                       
while  driving.  That  drinking  impairs  driving  is  what  explains  why  one  ought  not  do                             
both.  Regardless  of  what  norm  on  inquiry  is  endorsed,  something  needs  to  be  said                             
regarding  how  belief  or  knowledge  is  connected  to  inquiry  such  that  it  is  off  limits  to                                 
do  both.  Call  this  the  connection  lacuna.  
The  connection  can  be  made  by  pairing  IGN  with  the  view  that  knowledge  is  the                               
aim  of  inquiry.  In  recent  work,  this  view  can  be  found  in  Williamson  (2000),  Schaffer                               
(2005),  Whitcomb  (2010),  Kappel  (2010),  Kelp  (2011,  2014,  forthcoming),  Millar  (2011),                       
Rysiew  (2012),  and  even  Friedman  (2017,  322)  who  writes  that  “the  point  or  purpose  or                               
aim  of  opening  [a  question]  is…  to  improve  our  epistemic  standing  on  some                           
matter — to  settle  a  question  and  to  come  to  know.”  We  will  shortly  canvass  two  ways                               
to  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  knowledge  is  inquiry’s  aim.  The  first  proceeds  via                            
reflection  on  the  nature  of  inquiry.  The  second  proceeds  via  reflection  on  the  nature                             
of  knowledge.  The  point  of  this  exercise  is  not  to  endorse  any  particular  motivation                             
for  the  conclusion  that  knowledge  is  the  aim  of  inquiry.  Our  goal  is  just  to  reveal  a                                   
natural  way  in  which  IGN  alone  can  satisfy  the  connection  lacuna .   
Taking  an  idea  from  Maitra  (2011),  we  propose  that,  when  activities  have  a  goal  or                               
purpose,  norms  governing  that  activity  are  generated  to  facilitate  the  fulfillment  of                         
that  goal.  Consider  professional  basketball.  The  goal  of  winning  by  scoring  the  most                           
points  in  the  time  allotted  generates  prohibitions  on  play  like  Do  not  let  the  shot  clock                                 
expire  without  taking  a  shot  and  Do  not  shoot  mid-range  jumpers.  These  are  not                             
constitutive  norms  that  determine  what  basketball  is  as  a  competitive  activity.  But                         
they  direct  players  towards  the  goal  of  winning  by  regulating  their  on-court  behavior.                           
Players  who  violate  these  prohibitions  are  liable  to  blame  or  to  be  benched  for  not                               
playing  the  game  to  win.     
The  activity  of  inquiry  is  no  exception.  If  its  goal  is  knowledge  in  a  complete                               
answer,  we  would  expect  inquiry  to  have  one  or  more  norms  involving  knowledge.                           
For  example,  inquiry,  given  its  goal,  might  be  regulated  by  norms  corresponding  to                           
when  to  initially  start  inquiry  like  if  you  know  p Q ,  do  not  start  inquiring  into  Q.  Or  it                                     
might  be  governed  by  norms  corresponding  to  when  to  terminate  inquiry  such  as                           
stop  inquiring  into  Q  once  you  know  p Q .  These  are  undoubtedly  both  controversial                           
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norms  but  they  are  pretty  boring  and  mundane  if  knowledge  is  the  aim  of  inquiry.                               
Consider  basketball  again.  It  plausibly  has  similar  initiation  and  termination  norms                       
such  as  Stop  playing  basketball  once  you  have  scored  the  most  points  in  the  time  allotted .                                 
Accordingly,  a  wide-scope  norm  like  IGN  is  generated  if  knowledge  in  the  complete                           
answer  is  the  aim  or  purpose  of  inquiry.  The  initiation  and  termination  norms  just                             
mentioned  are  one  intermediary  step  from  inquiry  aiming  at  knowledge  to  IGN.                         15
The  connection  lacuna  is  thereby  fulfilled.  One  ought  not  inquire  into  Q  and                           
know  p Q  because  achieving  knowledge  is  the  point  of  inquiring  into  Q .  Insofar  as  an                               
activity’s  aim  is  achieved,  the  activity  terminates  because  its  purpose  is  fulfilled.                         
There  would  be  no  point  to  continuing  the  activity.  Nor  would  there  be  any  purpose                               
in  initiating  the  activity.     
What  about  DBI?  We  do  not  have  a  similar  path  to  closing  the  connection                             
lacuna .  Belief  o en  falls  short  of  knowledge.  As  a  result,  mere  belief  cannot  on  its                               
own  satisfy  inquiry’s  aim  and  hence  cannot  on  its  own  render  inquiry  improper.                           
Belief  is  but  a  doxastic  step  in  the  direction  of  achieving  inquiry’s  aim.  In  what                               
follows,  we  develop  this  point  in  further  detail  by  considering  two  reasons  one  might                             
maintain  that  achieving  knowledge  is  inquiry’s  aim.   
4.1  Inquiry  and  the  desire  to  know   
The  kind  of  inquiry  that  has  been  our  focus  is  not  simply  a  mechanical  search  for  an                                   
epistemic  good.  Rather,  it  is  the  sort  of  inquiry  that  is  guided  by  an  interrogative                               
attitude,  an  attitude  which  typifies  an  agent’s  sincere  interest  in  answering  the                         
question  at  issue.  Nonetheless  it  is  still  natural  to  analyze  this  sort  of  sincere  interest                               
in  terms  of  a  desire  for  an  epistemic  good.  But  what  sort  of  epistemic  good  is  being                                   
desired  when  one  has  a  sincere  interest  in  answering  a  question?  It  is  natural  to                               
suppose,  as  many  others  have,  that  the  answer  is  knowledge.  To  put  it  another  way,                               
sincerely  inquiring  agents  desire  to  know  the  answers  to  their  questions  (Pierce  1998,                           
Loewenstein  1994,  Williamson  2000,  Whitcomb  2010,  a.o. ).  Discourses  like  (30)  and                       16
(31)  provide  reason  to  think  as  much.   
(30)  #  Even  though  I  wonder  who  was  at  the  party,  I  don’t  want  to  know  who  was                                     
there.     
(31)  I’m  curious  about  whether  there  is  milk  or  kefir  in  the  fridge.     
15  We  will  not  argue  in  this  paper  that  one  properly  terminates  an  activity  if  and  only  if  the  goal  of                                           
that  activity  is  attained.  Though  attainment  seems  to  ensure  proper  termination,  proper  termination                           
may  not  guarantee  attainment.  For  activities  with  a  goal  or  aim  that  can  be  put  along  a  scale,  it  is                                         
plausible  that  some  activities  allow  proper  termination  at  attainment  and  at  some  lower  point  on  the                                 
scale.  Were  DBI  correct,  one  might  hypothesize  that  inquiry  fits  this  description.  Knowledge  is  its                               
aim,  but  full  belief  sets  the  minimum  threshold  for  proper  termination.  But  two  observations  about                               
this  hypothesis  are  worthwhile.  First,  the  connection  lacuna  would  still  remain.  An  explanation                           
would  still  be  owed  for  why  one  can  properly  terminate  inquiry  at  a  lower  point  on  the  scale.  Second,                                       
the  hypothesis  would  need  to  distinguish  quitting  from  proper  termination .  To  illustrate  the                           
distinction,  consider  a  chess  player  who  walks  away  from  a  game  before  its  completion  because  they                                 
are  bored  or  see  no  way  to  win.  Such  a  player  quits  as  opposed  to  properly  terminates  the  game.  The                                         
distinction  matters  because  it  is  conceivable  that  agents  who  stop  inquiry  at  full  belief  are  quitting  as                                  
opposed  to  properly  terminating:  they  see  no  way  to  arrive  at  knowledge,  or  they  are  practically                                 
deterred.     
16  Friedman  (2013)  argues  against  analyzing  IAs  like  curiosity  as  metacognitive  states  like  desires                             
to  know.  We  do  not  assess  her  case  here.  But  note  that  even  if  IAs  are  not  identical  with  metacognitive                                         
states,  inquiry  might  still  require  a  metacognitive  state  to  accompany  an  IA.     
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Would  you  like  me  to  let  you  know?     
#  Definitely  not.   
The  discourses  are  defective.  We  find  an  easy  explanation  why  if  inquiry  requires  a                             
desire  to  know.  The  discourses  ring  defective  because  they  exhibit  an  agent  inquiring                           
into  a  question  Q  for  which  they  do  not  desire  to  know  the  answer.     17
With  the  supposition  that  inquiry  requires  a  desire  to  know,  we  have  a                           
straightforward  path  to  satisfying  the  connection  lacuna  with  IGN .  Desires  aim                       
at  their  fulfillment.  Accordingly,  inquiry  aims  at  knowledge  because  that  is  what                         
satiates  the  inquisitive  agent's  desire  to  know.  Framed  in  terms  of  initiation  and                           
termination,  it  is  not  coherent  to  begin  having  a  desire  when  that  desire  is  already                               
fulfilled  or  to  continue  having  desire  a er  it  is  fulfilled.  Applied  to  the  desire  to                               
know,  it  is  not  coherent  to  desire  to  know  p Q  and  to  know  p Q .  The  norm  IGN                                   
captures  that  impropriety.   
The  same  path  cannot  be  followed  by  DBI .  The  desire  to  know  is  not  satisfied  by                                 
belief,  especially  when  one  does  not  regard  the  belief  as  knowledge.  An  illustration  is                             
given  by  Whitcomb  (2017,  160).  He  notes  that  (33)  is  uncooperative.     
  
(32)  Did  it  freeze  last  night?     
(33)  I  don’t  know  the  answer,  but  I’m  willing  to  help.  Go  talk  to  John.  There’s  a                                   
proposition  he  believes  to  be  the  answer.     
  
One  way  of  glossing  what  is  uncooperative  about  the  response  is  that  it  does  not  give                                 
the  agent  what  they  want.  What  they  want  is  knowledge  of  whether  it  froze  last                               
night.  But  redirecting  to  a  third-party  who  merely  believes,  the  response  fails  to                           
empower  the  inquiring  agent  to  fulfill  that  desire.  As  an  analogy,  suppose  you  had  a                               
late  night  craving  for  kefir.  It  would  be  similarly  uncooperative  to  recommend  that                           
you  visit  a  closed  grocery  store.  Cooperative  responses  help  agents  attain  their                         
desires.  Accordingly,  the  connection  lacuna  remains  for  DBI  given  the                     
supposition  that  a  desire  to  know  animates  inquiry.  Belief  is  just  not  enough                           
epistemically.     
4.2  Inquiry  and  the  function  of  knowledge   
One  way  to  glean  insight  into  matters  epistemological  is  by  investigating  the                         
function  or  purpose  of  our  epistemic  concepts.  The  locus  classicus  of  this  approach                           
is  Craig  (1990).  He  takes  the  function  of  knowledge  to  be  tagging  reliable  informants.                             
But  many  amend  Craig’s  proposal  to  suggest  that  knowledge  certifies  an  informant                         
as  having  a  strong  enough  epistemic  position  to  terminate  inquiry  (Schaffer  2005,                         
17  Desires  conflict.  The  desire  to  know  is  no  different.  We  submit  that  cases  where  an  agent  is                                     
inquiring  into  a  question  for  which  they  do  not  want  to  know  the  answer —whether  a  partner  is                                   
faithful,  whether  the  calorie  count  of  kefir  is  too  high—are  cases  of  conflicted  desires.  In  inquiring,                                 
the  agent  desires  to  know  the  answer  to  their  question,  but  they  also  desire  to  not  know  the  answer                                       
because  they  are  afraid  of  what  it  might  be.      
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Kappel  2010,  Kelp  2011,  Rysiew  2012).  In  considering  other  epistemic  positions,                       18
Rysiew  (2012,  278)  writes:   
Given  that  there  are  plenty  of  terms  available  for  picking  out  informants  of  one  or                               
another  degree  of  reliability,  what’s  special  about  ‘ know(s) ’?  Why  do  children  acquire  that                           
concept  so  early  in  life  (Bartsch  and  Wellman  1995)?  And  why  is  ‘ know(s) ’  one  of  our  ten                                   
most  common  verbs  (Davies  and  Gardner  2010,  cited  in  Nagel  2010:  408)?  The                           
certification  view  suggests  an  answer:  unlike  most  epistemic  and  quasi-epistemic  terms                       
(‘reliable’,  ‘justified’,  ‘rational’,  etc.)  ‘knows’  does  not  admit  of  degrees;  unlike  most  of                           
these  terms  too,  it  is  both  factive  (like  the  straight  ‘p’)  and  evaluative;  and  unlike  ‘certain’                                 
(as  applied  to  a  proposition),  say,  given  a  broad  non-skeptical  orientation  it’s  clear  that                             
the  standards  for  its  correct  application  are  neither  too  high  to  o en  be  met  nor  much                                 
more  demanding  than  what  our  ordinary  purposes  require.  In  view  of  this  combination  of                             
features,  ‘knows’  appears  to  be  very  well  suited  for  playing  the  certification  role,  a  role                               
calling  for  a  certain  finality  or  categorical  effect.   
Rysiew’s  guiding  idea  is  that  various  properties  of  the  verb  knows  —  its  universality                             
and  its  early  childhood  acquisition  relative  to  other  epistemic  terms  —  as  well  as  of                               
knowledge  —  its  non-degreedness,  factivity,  and  evaluativity  —  motivate  that                     
knowledge  attributions  certify  when  an  agent  has  reached  a  point  where  no  further                           
investigation  by  that  agent  is  needed  for  others  to  rely  on  their  epistemic  labor.                             
Kappel  (2010)  reasons  a  little  differently.  One  way  to  understand  his  point  is  that                             
there  is  something  distinctive  about  what  inquirers  do  when  they  close  inquiry.                         
Inquiries  are  taxing  activities  and  it’s  always  possible  for  inquirers  to  seek  additional                           
evidence.  Inquirers  are  therefore  interested  in  being  in  a  position  where  they  may                           
rely  on  their  answers  to  questions  without  having  to  inquire  into  the  matter  any                             
further.  For  Kappel,  the  concept  of  knowledge  certifies  that  further  inquiry  is  not                           
required.     
Suppose  the  role  of  knowledge  is  what  Rysiew,  Kappel,  and  others  theorize.  It                           
follows  that  knowledge  is  the  aim  or  goal  of  inquiry.  Agents  can  terminate  inquiry                             
only  when  they  have  achieved  the  activity’s  aim:  that  is,  only  when  they  have  come  to                                 
occupy  the  epistemic  position  certifying  as  much.  Only  a er  knowledge  of  a                         
question’s  answer  is  attained  is  there  no  longer  cause  to  further  investigate  various                           
answers.  Otherwise,  it  is  worthwhile  for  agents  to  continue  accumulating  evidence                       
for  and  against  answers  to  their  inquiry’s  question.     
T he  certification  view  equips  IGN  to  navigate  the  connection  lacuna .                     
Knowing  p Q  certifies  that  inquiry  into  Q  is  closed.  To  continue  an  activity  a er  it  is                                 
certifiably  completed  is  incoherent.  Consider  the  incoherence  of  We  scored  the  most                         
points  in  the  time  allotted,  but  I  am  going  to  try  to  win  the  game.  That  is  incoherent  in  the                                         
same  manner  as  I  know  that  there  is  le over  milk,  but  I  wonder  whether  there  is  le over                                   
milk .  Both  discourses  betray  a  deep  confusion  about  the  goal-directed  activity  in                         
which  the  speaker  is  participating.  As  a  purposive  norm, IGN  prohibits  such                        
incoherence  within  inquiry.   
It  is  difficult  again  to  see  how  DBI  can  satisfy  the  connection  lacuna  given                             
what  we  have  supposed.  If  knowledge  certifies  that  inquiry  is  closed,  a  position                           
18  There  are  other  ways  on  which  knowledge  might  be  question-relative  which  do  not  require  a                                 
function-theoretic  approach  to  epistemology.  See  Hookway  (1996)  and  Schaffer  (2005,  2008,  2015).  The                           
significance  to  IGN  and  the  connection  lacuna  is  presumably  the  same.  For  reasons  of  space,  we                                 
overlook  these  theories.     
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short  of  knowledge  like  belief  would  not  perform  the  same  inquiry-theoretic  role.                         
The  point  can  be  made  in  terms  of  double-checking.  If  knowledge  uniquely  certifies                           
that  further  double-checking  is  unnecessary,  weaker  positions  still  properly  compel                     
double-checking.   
5.  Exhaustivity   
The  sort  of  inquiry  we  have  been  studying  —  inquiry  guided  by  some  interrogative                             
attitude  — is  governed  by  a  variety  of  norms  that  constrain  how  inquirers  must                           
conduct  themselves.  When  it  comes  to  which  epistemic  positions  are  permissible  to                         
occupy  while  engaged  in  inquiry,  we  have  so  far  argued  that  IGN ,  a  prohibition                             
against  inquiring  and  knowing,  has  explanatory  primacy.  We  have  made  our  case  by                           
contrasting  IGN  with  DBI ,  a  norm  defended  by  Friedman  (2019 a ).  The  case  had  two                             
parts.  First,  we  argued  that  data  motivating  DBI  can  be  explained  by  ign .  There  is  no                                 
explanatory  work  for  a  weaker  norm  to  do.  Second,  we  argued  that  DBI  has  problems                               
that  IGN  does  not.     
A  parallel  case  can  be  made  against  any  norm  that  prohibits  inquiring  while                           
occupying  an  epistemic  position  weaker  than  knowledge.  In  particular,  consider  the                       
problems  that  afflict  DBI .  The  first  was  that  it  mistakenly  identifies  hedging  during                           
inquiry  as  prohibited.  But  it  is  not.  This  problem  easily  generalizes.  We  do  not  just                               
hedge  by  indicating  belief.  O en  we  hedge  by  indicating  a  stronger  position.  For                           
example,  (34)  and  (35)  are  variants  on  our  earlier  examples  of  hedging  that  indicate  a                               
stronger  position.   
  
(34)  I  am  almost  /  nearly  certain  there  is  le over  milk.  However,  I  forgot  my                               
glasses  and  it  was  hard  to  tell  if  what  I  saw  was  milk  or  kefir.  So  I  don’t  really                                       
know.  I’m  gonna  find  my  glasses  and  then  check  again.   
(35)  I  am  extremely  confident  that  only  Borya  was  at  the  party.  But  I  don’t  know                                 
that.  So  let’s  ask  Kolya,  the  party’s  host,  to  figure  out  who  was  at  the  party.   
Neither  discourse  is  defective.  Both  coherently  display  where  an  agent  might  find                         
themselves  during  inquiry.  But  various  norms  stronger  than  DBI  but  weaker  than                         
IGN  in  what  position  is  prohibited  will  mishandle  such  discourses.  A  similar  point                           
can  be  made  with  Whitcomb’s  (2017)  declining  data.   
The  second  problem  with  DBI  was  that  it  could  not  resolve  the  connection  lacuna                             
in  conjunction  with  the  view  that  knowledge  is  the  aim  or  goal  of  inquiry.  One’s                               
continued  participation  in  an  activity  which  has  its  goal  fulfilled  is  incoherent.  If                           
knowledge  is  the  aim  of  inquiry,  then  inquiring  into  Q  while  knowing  p Q  is                             
incoherent.  IGN  captures  such  incoherence  as  a  purposive  norm.  But  a  similar                         
explanation  cannot  be  given  for  any  norm  involving  a  weaker  position  than                         
knowledge.  When  you  have  yet  to  achieve  the  goal  of  an  activity,  you  may  coherently                               
continue  to  participate  in  that  activity.  As  such,  arriving  at  justified  belief,  near                           
certainty,  or  what-have-you  is  not  enough  for  incoherence.  Knowledge  has  not  yet                         
been  achieved.     
Of  the  two  problems,  the  second  is  perhaps  less  threatening  for  DBI  and  similar                             
norms.  One  may  just  deny  that  explaining  the  connection  lacuna  has  to  be                           
closed  while  supposing  that  knowledge  is  inquiry’s  aim.  One  can  even  mirror  the                           
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explanation  we  gave  of  the  connection  lacuna  by  supposing  that  V  is  inquiry’s                           
aim  where  V  is  whatever  epistemic  position  a  rival  norm  prohibits  one  from                           
occupying  while  they  inquire.  But  we  are  skeptical  about  a  mirrored  explanation                         
because  we  are  optimistic  about  the  reasons  highlighted  above  for  why  inquiry  has                           
its  goal  achieved  with  knowledge.  Views  according  to  which  inquiry  involves  a  desire                           
to  have  belief  or  where  function  of  belief  is  certifying  inquiry’s  termination  strike  us                             
as  non-starters.     
The  type  of  inquiry  we  have  been  examining  is  tightly  connected  with  the                           
suspension  of  judgment  and  the  nature  of  belief.  We  have  not  discussed  these                           19
topics.  But  what  we  have  argued  is  that  the  question  of  which  conduct  is                             
epistemically  prohibited  during  inquiry  carries  consequences  for  these  other  topics.                     
For  example,  what  we  have  argued  is  at  odds  with  the  view  that  inquiry  requires                               
suspension  towards  a  question  Q  and  that  suspension  is  incompatible  or  improper                         
alongside  belief  that  p Q  (Friedman  2017).  Hedging  in  inquiry  shows  that  one  can                           
properly  inquire  and  believe.  Accordingly,  either  inquiry  does  not  require  suspension                       
or  suspension  is  compatible  or  proper  with  belief.  We  leave  the  reader  on  their  own                               
to  untangle  these  issues.   20
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